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Abstract: One of the most puzzling facts in economics is the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect. After
controlling for the observable characteristics of workers (age, gender, education, residence etc.),
ﬁrms (industry, occupation, work conditions etc.) and negotiation eﬀect (unionization), one
still ﬁnds that the sheer size of a ﬁrm increases the wage, contrary to the one-good one-price
doctrine.
We provide a simple dynamic game model of wage determination to give a new rationale to
the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect. We think that the wages are not market clearing prices but strategies
by ﬁrms. Firms choose wages to control workers search behavior. The essential feature of the
model is that a large ﬁrms history of wages is observable to all the current and future workers,
while a small ﬁrm is not visible and only its current oﬀer is observable. Therefore a small ﬁrm
is expected to be a myopic low-wage payer, and its workers will search for outside oﬀers and
quit often. A large ﬁrm can prevent search if it maintained a high wage throughout the past,
by making workers expect high future wages. In this way, the ﬁrm size determines the worker
expectations of its future wages, which changes the quit rate and equilibrium wages.
To give additional support to our theoretical result, we test a new aspect of ﬁrm size-wage
eﬀect. Since the eﬀect on wage levels are extensively studied, we derive two main hypotheses
on wage gains after job changes. (H1) The proportion of ﬁrms that are larger than the previous
employer increases the wage gain. (H2) The size of the previous employer decreases the wage
gain. The ﬁrm size distribution eﬀect (H1) is a new test. We obtain supports for both. Thus
we conclude that the wages are strategies and aﬀected by how workers utilize the ﬁrm size
information in changing jobs.
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11 Introduction
One of the famous “puzzles” in economics is the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect. There is ample evidence
(Lester, 1967, Brown and Medoﬀ, 1989, Abowd et al., 1999 and Bayard and Troske, 1999)
that ﬁrm size increases the wages after controlling for work conditions (industry, occupation,
region, dangerous work, etc.), worker characteristics (education, gender, age, experience, etc.),
and negotiation eﬀects (unionization). If labor service is a commodity which is traded based
on its price (wage), the job and worker characteristics should identify a single commodity and
therefore a single price (wage) should prevail. The reality is, however, that the same person
doing the same task can be paid diﬀerently at diﬀerent ﬁrms, and overall the sheer size of the
employer has a positive eﬀect on wages, as Thaler (1989, p. 181) describes:
A few years ago we hired a new secretary in my department. She was smart and
eﬃcient and we were pleased to have her. Much to our dismay, after just a few
months she was oﬀered and accepted a job from an IBM facility in a nearby city.
She told me that she had been on a waiting list there for a year or so, and would
be a fool to turn IBM down since they paid so much more than any of the other
local employers. I wondered at the time whether her marginal product typing IBM
interoﬃce memos could be that much higher than it would be typing manuscripts
and referee reports, and/or why IBM should ﬁnd it proﬁtable to pay much more
than the going wage.
Most of the proposed explanations of the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect fall into two lines of thought.
(1) Unobserved diﬀerences (Bayard and Troske, 1999; Troske, 1999): There can be factors af-
fecting wages that are not measured in the data and related to ﬁrm sizes. Weiss and Landau
(1984) suggest that large ﬁrms have higher hiring standards than small ﬁrms. However, Torske
(1999) rejects this hypothesis after showing that the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect remains after control-
ling for worker skills. This work conﬁrms earlier work on the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect (e.g., Brown
and Medoﬀ, 1989) which found a remaining ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect after controlling for various
proposed explanations. Thus, theorists need to continue searching for factors that aﬀect the
wages and are related to ﬁrm size.
2(2) Eﬃciency wage: This theory assumes that the labor is not traded like a commodity, but
induced by the ﬁrm’s strategic wage setting (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984). A ﬁrm pays
wages to reward workers’ eﬀort and threatens against shirking by ﬁring. Bulow and Summers
(1986) suggest that large ﬁrms cannot monitor workers as well as small ﬁrms, and thus pay
more for the same work. While this is compatible with workers’ incentives, it is not compatible
with ﬁrms’ incentive to improve the monitoring to avoid unnecessary rewards. Moreover, large
ﬁrms have stronger monitoring than small ﬁrms (Kalleberg and Van Buren, 1996). Burdett
and Mortensen (1998) and Coles (1998) formulate dynamic strategic wage-setting models where
high wages induce high eﬀort and low quit rate and therefore the size eﬀect is a result of the
high wage. Their models assume that a ﬁrm is indiﬀerent among many wage levels to generate
multiple equilibrium wages. However, it has been empirically shown (e.g., Abowd et al., 1999)
that large ﬁrms and high-wage ﬁrms are more proﬁtable, so the equal proﬁt assumption is in
doubt.
In this paper we improve upon these two ideas. We make a simple game between a ﬁrm
and homogenous workers, where each worker can quit by taking an outside oﬀer,1 based on
Fujiwara-Greve (1999a). In each period the ﬁrm sets a wage level strategically to control
workers’ turnover rate, and the current worker forms an expectation on the ﬁrm’s future wages
to decide whether to search for an outside oﬀer. The strategic wage setting corresponds to
the eﬃciency wage idea. We also assume that a large ﬁrm’s past wages are observable to all
the current and future workers, while a small ﬁrm is not so visible and only its current wage
is observable. The diﬀerence in observability is the factor that has not been incorporated in
previous models but is shown to aﬀect the equilibrium wages.
The observability of ﬁrm behavior aﬀects equilibrium wages as follows. A ﬁrm cannot com-
mit to future wages, and therefore the workers’ expectation of the future wages determines the
quit rate. Workers form expectations using available signals2 of the ﬁrm’s behavior. Small size
or a low wage in the past are considered to be signals of low future wages. Large size and high
1Although the ability to quit is clearly a normal feature of the employment relations, it is unusual in game
theory. In the ordinary game framework, the set of players is ﬁxed throughout the game, while in our game
there is an exit option. For a general analysis of games with outside oﬀers, see Fujiwara-Greve (1999b).
2Our idea is similar to (the reverse of) Spence’s singalling model (1974) where workers choose their education
levels to signal their abilities. In our model, however, there is no incomplete information, or “types” of a ﬁrm.
Hence a signal means just an observation of the past actions and the ﬁrm size.
3wages throughout the past are signals of high future wages. We show that these expectations
are conﬁrmed, and there are two kinds of subgame perfect equilibria with stationary equilibrium
wages:
[Myopic Equilibrium] Regardless of the ﬁrm size or its past wage oﬀers (if observable), the
ﬁrm always oﬀers the minimum wage and the workers always search and quit often. In this
equilibrium, the strategies by the ﬁrm and the workers are myopic and the past wage information
is not utilized even if it is available. (Proposition 2.)
[“Reputation” Equilibrium3] If the ﬁrm is large, it always oﬀers a high wage and its workers do
not search. If the ﬁrm is small, or if a large ﬁrm oﬀered a low wage (an oﬀ-path behavior), they
go to the myopic equilibrium. The logic behind this equilibrium is that workers’ expectation
(or the ﬁrm’s reputation as a high wage payer) can collaps forever once a large ﬁrm sent a bad
signal, a low wage. Hence a large ﬁrm chooses between maintaining a high-wage reputation or
oﬀering a low wage and going to the myopic equilibrium. It is shown that if the turnover cost
is not too low, a large ﬁrm prefers to prevent search. A small ﬁrm does not have a chance to
reduce the turnover cost because it cannot change the worker expectation signiﬁcantly. Hence
the size diﬀerence generates equilibrium wage diﬀerence. (Proposition 3.)
Thus we show that ﬁrm size aﬀects equilibrim wages via an observability diﬀerence which
inﬂuences worker expectations. It is intuitive that a large ﬁrm is visible to the public and
therefore is careful about its behavior that aﬀects its long-run reputation, while a small ﬁrm
cannot inﬂuence the public opinion about its behavior and thus is myopic. To support our
theoretical conclusion, in the second half of the paper we give new evidence that ﬁrm size
aﬀects wages as predicted by our model but not by alternative models of the ﬁrm-size wage
eﬀect.
We focus on the ﬁrm-size eﬀect on wage gains after job changes, since the ﬁrm-size eﬀect
on wage levels are extensively studied. Wage gains are strongly aﬀected by workers’ strategic
search. We derive and test the following hypotheses: (a) Given the current employer’s size, if the
outside oﬀer distribution has many ﬁrms in the larger size category than the current employer,
then a worker becomes selective (because it is a good opportunity set) and only takes a large
3The term “reputation” here means a trigger strategy. Our game has complete information and is thus
diﬀerent from the incomplete information models of reputation. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1996) for general
reputation models, and Martinelli (1997) for an adverse-selection, moral-hazard model of ﬁrm reputation.
4wage gain when changing ﬁrms. Therefore the average wage gain after job changes increases
when there is a higher proportion of larger ﬁrms. (b) Given the outside oﬀer distribution, if
the current employer is large, then the worker cannot improve the wages by a large margin
when changing ﬁrms, because there are not so many larger (i.e., higher wage) ﬁrms to move
to. Therefore the average wage gain after job changes decreases as the current employer’s size
is larger.
Prediction (a) is unique to our model. If job searchers do not take into account the size
distribution of potential employers, there should not be a correlation between ﬁrm size dis-
tribution and the wage changes, so this is a new prediction derived from the model and not
shared by other models. For example, if the wages are market clearing prices, there should
not be an eﬀect of size distribution. If the wages are set for the ﬁrm’s proﬁt maximization
only, there should not be the size distribution eﬀect either. Our model predicts that there is
an interaction between workers strategic search and ﬁrms’ long-run proﬁt maximization, which
leads to the ﬁrm-size distribution eﬀect on wages. (b) is a standard eﬀect of ﬁrm size but on
the wage gains instead of on the wage levels. Support for (b) strengthens evidence for the ﬁrm
size eﬀect in general.
Using a unique dataset4 that records detailed work histories of almost 3000 Norwegian men,
we ﬁnd support for both implications. We control for the usual observable characteristics of
workers and jobs. We obtain support for both (a) and (b). Therefore the result implies that
wages are strategies, that is, accepted oﬀers by the workers who make search decisions based not
only the current employer’s size but also on their opportunity set (the ﬁrm size distribution).
Our other empirical results are standard and consistent with the literature. Thus, this paper
makes a theoretical contribution to the wage determination models by introducing the eﬀect of
worker expectations driven by the ﬁrm size and observability of ﬁrm behaviors, and an empirical
contribution by showing that wages are aﬀected by the distribution of ﬁrm sizes in an industry
and how workers move strategically among ﬁrms.
4As Bayard and Troske (1999) noted, insuﬃcient data on both workers’ characteristics and employers’ has
been a problem in examining the detailed properties of ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect.
52 Job Search Game with Observability Diﬀerence
2.1 Model
The players of the game are a ﬁrm and a sequence of workers it hires for a position in such
a way that at any point of time t = 1,2,3,..., one person is hired. Multiple positions at the
ﬁrm is a straightforward extension with the interpretation that the ﬁrm plays an independent
game for each position. The ﬁrm has a ﬁxed size, large or small, and the size is observable
to all workers. All the players are inﬁnitely lived and discount the future payoﬀs with factor
δ ∈ (0,1). At the beginning of the game, the ﬁrm has a worker in the position. To begin the
ﬁrst period, the ﬁrm oﬀers a wage level w1 ∈ [w,∞) for the next period, but also pays w1 as
the initial payment. The level w is the minimum wage. Knowing the next period wage and the
size of the ﬁrm, the current worker decides whether to search for an outside oﬀer (with cost
s/(1 − δ) where s > 0) or not to search (with no cost). At the same time the worker produces
a value v to the ﬁrm. An outside oﬀer is a stationary5 income sequence x,x,x,... and x is
independently and identically distributed according to a cumulative distribution function F
over a compact interval [w,w] with density f. If the worker accepts the oﬀer x,x,x,..., he/she
leaves the ﬁrm at the end of the period and starts receiving x thereafter, and the ﬁrm has to
incur cost c > 0 to hire a new worker at the beginning of the second period. With a new worker,
the second period is just as the ﬁrst period of the game. If the current worker did not quit, the
next period starts with the same ﬁrm-worker pair and the ﬁrm pays the promised wage w1 and
makes a new promise w2 ∈ [w,∞) for the third period. After the third-period wage oﬀer by
the ﬁrm, the current worker chooses whether to search or not, and the game continues this way
over the inﬁnite horizon t = 1,2,3,.... Past outside oﬀers cannot be recalled, and a worker
who searched does not necessarily accept the oﬀer he/she got for that period. The workers
have identical productivity v and outside oﬀer distribution F. Figure 1 shows the timing of the
actions and oﬀers.
=== Insert Figure 1 about here. ===
The ﬁrm’s stage payoﬀ depends on whether it has a new employee and its wage oﬀer in the
5One can interpret a stationary outside oﬀer being another stationary equilibrium of a game with another
employer. It is straightforward to extend the model for a general sequence of an oﬀer and the similar two
equilibria obtain.
6past wt−1 and this period wt.
Πt =
(
v − wt − c if the current worker is new
v − wt−1 otherwise.
A worker’s stage payoﬀ at period t depends on the ﬁrm’s past wage oﬀer wt−1, current oﬀer
wt (depending on whether he/she is a new employee) and whether he/she searches. A hired
worker’s stage payoﬀ is
Wt =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
wt if he/she is a new employee and does not search
wt − s
1−δ if he/she is a new employee and searches
wt−1 if he/she is a continuing employee and does not search
wt−1 − s
1−δ if he/she is a continuing employee and searches.
Once he/she accepts an oﬀer x,x,x..., his/her stage payoﬀ is x thereafter.
Both the ﬁrm and the workers maximize the total discounted expected payoﬀs over the
inﬁnite horizon. The players are assumed to know the payoﬀ functions of all the players,
workers’ outside oﬀer distribution, and the timing of the game. We assume that workers’
search decisions and realization of outside oﬀers are only observable to the relevant worker,
which is realistic. Quit decisions are naturally observable to the ﬁrm.
Moreover we assume that if the ﬁrm is large, the entire history of the ﬁrm’s wage oﬀers
is observable to the current and future workers, while if the ﬁrm is small, only the currently
standing oﬀer is observable to the workers. (For t = 1, the only information is the ﬁrm size
before the ﬁrm makes the ﬁrst oﬀer w1.) Therefore, we distinguish the history in period t on
which the players base their actions, depending on whether the ﬁrm is large or small. If the
ﬁrm is large, the history at (the beginning of) period t is all the past oﬀers until the last period,
{w1,w2,...,wt−1}, and if the ﬁrm is small, the history at t is only the currently standing oﬀer
wt−1, if its worker did not quit last period. If a small ﬁrm has a new employee, the only
information available is its size before the ﬁrm’s oﬀer.6 In each period, the ﬁrm chooses the
wage oﬀer contingent on the relevant history. Since the worker uses the wage oﬀer in the search
and acceptance decision, the wage oﬀer controls the turnover rate and the ﬁrm’s turnover cost.
The current worker makes the search decision and acceptance decision of a realized oﬀer based
not only on the ﬁrm size, the history at t, and the next-period wage oﬀer, but also on his/her
6The observability diﬀerence assumption is not necessary to generate multiple equilibrium wages, as Fujiwara-
Greve (1999a) gives a symmetric-ﬁrm model with equilibrium wage diﬀerentials. The observability diﬀerence
makes it impossible for a small ﬁrm to make a reputation and thus to go to the high-wage equilibrium.
7expectation of the future wages at the ﬁrm. In equilibrium, the expectation must be conﬁrmed
by the ﬁrm’s actual strategy.
2.2 Subgame Perfect Equilibria
Although this game has a stochastic element of the outside oﬀers, the uncertainty is resolved
in each period and the worker cannot recall the past oﬀers to change actions later. We can
then use the subgame perfect equilibrium concept.7 In the following we focus on equilibria with
stationary equilibrium wages to examine the time-invariant ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect.
The subgame perfect equilibria with stationary equilibrium wages are constructed as follows.
First, suppose that a worker expects that the ﬁrm will oﬀer a stationary wage w,w,w,.... Then
an optimal strategy is either to search every period with a stationary reservation level (to be
computed below) in the acceptance decision or never to search. Notice that if an outside oﬀer
x,x,x,... is worth accepting, then any oﬀer y,y,y,... such that y ≥ x is also acceptable. Thus
the optimal acceptance decision has the reservation level property such that any oﬀer not less
than a reservation level is accepted. Second, given the workers’ optimal strategy, we show that
a small ﬁrm or a ﬁrm with low-wage expectation (by the workers) oﬀers the minimum wage
every period in equilibrium. Third, a large ﬁrm with high wage expectation oﬀers a high wage
every period (and prevents search) in equlibrium. Therefore, in subgame perfect equilibria, a
large ﬁrm pays higher wages than a small ﬁrm, although we did not impose any heterogeneity
in work conditions, worker productivities, or outside opportunities for workers.






Proposition 1: Take any subgame where the ﬁrm has just paid a wage u and oﬀered a wage
w for the next period. Suppose that a worker expects that the ﬁrm will continue to oﬀer
w,w,w,... in the future. Then, there exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that for any δ ≥ δ, the worker’s
7See for example Fudenberg and Tirole (1996).
8optimal strategy is: if w < ˆ wδ, then always search and accpet any oﬀer not less than R(w),
and if w ≥ ˆ wδ, then never search.




(x − ˆ wδ)f(x)dx = s. (1)
The reservation level R(w) is implicitly deﬁned by
R[1 − δF(R)] − δ
Z w
R
xf(x)dx = (1 − δ)w − s. (2)
Proof. See Appendix I.




xf(x)dx − δ[1 − F(y)]y = s.
The left hand side of this equation is strictly decreasing in y, and Assumption 1 implies that
for large enough δ’s, ˆ wδ exists uniquely and satisﬁes ˆ wδ > w. The positive search cost s > 0
implies that ˆ wδ < w. Given the workers’ optimal strategy by Proposition 1, we show that the
minimum wage is a stationary equilibrium wage regardless of the ﬁrm size.
Proposition 2: There exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that for any δ ≥ δ, the following strategy
combination is a subgame perfect equilibrium:
Firm: Regardless of its size and the past wage oﬀers, oﬀer w.
Workers: Regardless of the ﬁrm’s size, if the current oﬀer from the ﬁrm is w, then search with
reservation level R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w).
Proof. See Appendix I.
The idea of the proof is as follows. When the workers become patient (as δ becomes large),
the reservation level R(w)+(1−δ)(w−w) is close to R(w). Then even if the ﬁrm oﬀers a high
wage for one period, it cannot reduce the quit rate signiﬁcantly. Therefore the ﬁrm does not
have an incentive to deviate. Workers are playing a best response against the ﬁrm’s stationary
oﬀer by a similar logic to Proposition 1.
9Moreover, Fujiwara-Greve (1999a) shows that under ˆ wδ, the minimum wage is the unique
stationary wage. By contrast, any wage level above ˆ wδ can be an equilibrium wage if the ﬁrm
is large. Note that a ﬁrm has no incentive to oﬀer more than Min{v,w}.
Proposition 3: There exists δ ∈ (0,1) such that for any δ ≥ δ and any w∗ ∈ [ ˆ wδ,Min{v,w}]
and any c ≥ (w∗ − w)/[1 − F(R(w))], the following strategy combination is a subgame perfect
equilibrium.
Firm: If the ﬁrm is large, start the game by oﬀering w∗ and continue to oﬀer w∗ if it has never
oﬀered less than w∗ in the past. If the history includes an oﬀer less than w∗, oﬀer w. If the
ﬁrm is small, oﬀer w always.
Workers: If the ﬁrm is large and its oﬀer has never been less than w∗, then do not search.
Otherwise search with reservation level R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w) where w is the current oﬀer.
Proof. See Appendix I.
Thus we have derived the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect as subgame perfect equilibria with minimal
assumptions on the model. There is no heterogeneity in work conditions or worker productivities
(i.e., the same value v is generated at any ﬁrm by any worker).
The size-wage diﬀerential equilibrium has two parts; a trigger strategy combination for a
large ﬁrm, and the myopic equilibrium (using Proposition 2) for a small ﬁrm or for a large ﬁrm
after a deviation. The trigger strategy combination part becomes an equilibrium as follows.
Thanks to the observability of a large ﬁrm’s past oﬀers, the current and future workers can
punish a large ﬁrm if it lowers the wage by starting to search and quitting often. If the players
are patient (the discount factor δ is large) and the turnover cost c is not so small, a large ﬁrm
ﬁnds it more proﬁtable to maintain a high wage and to prevent search than going to the myopic
equilibrium.
It is also shown that the level of “high wage” can be any level above which the workers
optimally refrain from searching. In the ordinary repeated games, trigger strategy combinations
support all the feasible and individually rational payoﬀs (a folk theorem, see Fudenberg and
Tirole, 1996). Our proof is essentially an extension of this result, but in a new framework of
endogenous turnover in a game.
102.3 Implications
The fact that large ﬁrms are concerned with their “image” or “reputation” is well-known. The
reputation is not only what the current workers perceive but also what the potential future
workers will know. For a small ﬁrm, it is plausible that the future workers do not know its
past behavior so well. In a traditional competitive market model or in a one-shot game model,
however, the eﬀect of future workers’ expectations cannot be incorporated. Our theoretical
contribution is that we are able to make a dynamic game model which explicitly includes the
current and future worker expectations and relates the observability of ﬁrm’s actions to the
turnover rate.
The equilibria in Proposition 3 show not only the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect, but also that multiple
“high wages” are sustained. This is consistent with the ordinary folk theorem of repeated games
with no exit. Moreover, Bayard and Troske (1999) gave evidence that the size-wage premium
can vary across industries just like the multiple equilibria of Proposition 3. Our conclusion that
workers’ expectations constitute the unobserved diﬀerences causing the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect is
new, hence we derive new testable hypotheses and provide empirical evidence to support them.
The ﬁrm size eﬀect on wage levels has been tested extensively (e.g., Lester, 1967, Brown
and Medoﬀ, 1989, and Bayard and Troske, 1999). To give additional evidence, we focus on the
ﬁrm size eﬀect on the wage gains after job changes, i.e., the diﬀerence between the ﬁrst wage
at the new employer and the last wage at the previous employer. The wage gain is a variable
that is strongly aﬀected by how a worker chose the next employer and shows whether the job
changes are strategic or not.
Since we only observe the accepted oﬀers, we want to derive eﬀects on the average wage
gain given that the oﬀer exceeded the reservation level,
E[x | x ≥ R(w)] − w =
Z w
R(w)
xf(x)dx/[1 − F(R(w))] − w,
where w is the previous employer’s wage and R(w) is the optimal reservation level from (2).
The average conditional wage gain is dependent on the distribution of the outside oﬀers,
but it is unrealistic to assume that the worker knows the exact oﬀer distribution F. Instead we
assume that the worker uses the observable ﬁrm-size distribution as an approximation of the
oﬀer distribution. The ﬁrm-size wage eﬀect implies that there is a relationship that connects
11ﬁrm sizes to the future (stationary) wages. Deﬁne a ﬁrm-size wage function w : [z,z] → [w,w]
where z is the smallest size of a ﬁrm and z is the largest size, and assume that w is increasing.
Let G : [z,z] → [0,1] be the cumulative distribution function of the ﬁrms of sizes z ∈ [z,z], and
let the density function be g. Then the expected wage gain conditional on the oﬀer exceeding
a reservation level R0 is




R0 w(z)g(z)dz/[1 − G(R
0)] − w(z
∗),





R0 w(z)g(z)dz = (1 − δ)w(z
∗) − s (3)
Thus, the average wage gain W is inﬂuenced by the ﬁrm size distribution G and the previous
employer’s size z∗, both of which are observable. Notice that the functional form of the average
wage gain W and (3) show that only the high-end of the ﬁrm size distribution G is important.

















∆m |R0 is the eﬀect of m when the reservation level R0 is ﬁxed and ∆W
∆R0 |m is the eﬀect of
the change of the reservation level when the measure m is ﬁxed.
These three eﬀects are analyzed one by one below. Note that the optimal reservation level
R0 is not less than the previous employer size z∗ due to the increasing wage oﬀer function w.
[Distribution Eﬀect]: Given the reservation level, the expected conditional oﬀer is higher in
industry with a high proportion of ﬁrms larger than the previous employer. To see this, consider
an increase in m such that
R z
R0 g(z)dz increases by a small unit ∆. The numerator of the expected
wage
R z
R0 w(z)g(z)dz is increased by at least ∆w(R0), while the denominator is increased by ∆.
Therefore ∆W
∆m |R0> 0, for not too small w(R0).
12[Reservation Level Eﬀect]: By diﬀerentiation, the reservation level increases the average wage






R0[w(z) − w(R0)]g(z)dz > 0.
[Eﬀect on the Reservation Level]: As m increases, there are more larger ﬁrms in one’s oppor-
tunity set, and thus the reservation level should be at least weakly increasing. To see this,
consider the changes in the left hand side of (3) when m increases ∆ units of
R z
R0 g(z)dz. The
ﬁrst term w(R0)[1 − δG(R0)] increases by δw(R0)∆, while the second term −δ
R z
R0 w(z)g(z)dz
decreases at least δ∆w(R0). Thus the left hand side of (3) overall is weakly decreasing. Since
the left hand side of (3) is strictly increasing in R0, the reservation level R0 that equates the
both sides must be weakly increasing in m. That is, ∆R0
∆m ≥ 0.
Therefore the total eﬀect (4) of m on the wage gain is positive, and our ﬁrst hypothesis is;
[H1]: As the proportion of ﬁrms that are larger than the previous employer increases,
the wage gain after job changes increases.
Second, we show that the average wage gain is negatively correlated with the previous
employer’s wage, and therefore with its size. To determine the sign of ∂W
∂z∗, recall that w is
increasing in z. The total diﬀerentiation of (3) yields
w0(R0)[1 − δG(R0)]dR0 = (1 − δ)w0(z∗)dz∗,
hence ∂R0
∂z∗ = (1−δ)w0(z∗)/[(1−δG(R0))w0(R0)] > 0 and when the workers are patient (δ large),









for large δ’s. Hence, as the previous employer’s size increases, the average wage gain decreases.
An intuitive explanation of this eﬀect is that when the previous employer is large, the next
employer cannot be so much larger that a worker obtains a large wage gain by moving. Thus
our second hypothesis is;
[H2]: Given the outside opportunity distribution, a worker moving from a large ﬁrm
gets a lower wage increase.
13Finally, the desination ﬁrm size increases the wage gain by ordinary ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect.
[H3]: Given the outside opportunity distribution and the previous employer size, a
worker moving to a bigger ﬁrm gets a larger wage increase.
3 Test
3.1 Method and Data
The above predictions concern the wage gain from changing jobs, and can be tested directly
with data with multiple jobs per respondents and the starting and ending wages of each job.
Unfortunately, such data are rare since surveys tend to ask for the wages at a given date or
when the job is entered (but not left). The best data with such a structure that we are aware of
are the German and Norwegian Life History Studies, which are retrospective interview studies
of random samples of workers. Of these, the data of Norwegian study are publicly available
and are used here.
The data are a probability sample of over 1000 men in each of the 1921, 1931, and 1941
birth cohorts in Norway. Their work histories were coded from entry into the labor force until
exit or the survey year 1971, giving multiple jobs per worker. Face-to-face interviews were used
to collect work histories along with other important life events (education, marriage, children,
sickness). Although based on recall, this method of data collection has been shown to yield
high-quality data (Featherman, 1979; Carroll and Mayer, 1986). Each observation has ﬁrm
size and industry of the job and its starting and ending wages. The direct data on the wage
increase reduce the need for controlling for worker characteristics, although we still control
for education, experience, and the number of jobs held in the past. Appendix II shows the
deﬁnitions of the variables used in the analysis. Real (deﬂated) wages are used.
The data on size distributions are taken from the 1953 and 1963 census of establishments
in Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyr˚ a, 1953, 1963). These data display the distributions of estab-
lishment sizes (number of employees) in 9 categories. The measure of the proportion of ﬁrms





14where pi is the proportion of ﬁrms in i-th size category and j is the worker’s current ﬁrm-size
category (for j < k). For ﬁrms in the largest (50 and over) category, it is set to the proportion
of ﬁrms of size 200 and over.
We selected labor activity spells that were started after 1950 to avoid the instability of
the labor market caused by the war and its aftermath. We omitted jobs entered when the
worker was under 18 years old, as many of those were temporary. We omitted farm work,
military, unemployment, and partial employment and self-employment, as well as jobs entered
with an intervening period of unemployment, partial employment, or self-employment. We did
this because even short spells of non-regular employment (especially unemployment) aﬀect the
wages in the destination job (Mincer, 1986). Since the census did not report size distributions
for public administration, postal service, education and health services, jobs in those industries
are omitted. Though the data also show job changes within the ﬁrm, we only include job
changes across ﬁrm. This leaves 7,010 jobs fulﬁlling our criteria. Of those, jobs entered from
origin jobs in government or ﬁrms of unspeciﬁed size were excluded, leaving 5,087 jobs.
Of the jobs left, 2,916 had data on both origin and destination wages. Missing data on
starting or ending wages may cause sample-selection bias because the probability that a wage
is reported may depend on covariates of interest to us. This is controlled for by a Tobit type
II model (Amemiya, 1985) where the selection equation and the regression equation have joint
normal disturbances that may be correlated. That is, we jointly estimate a selection equation
of binary outcome yi (observation in sample) and a wage gain equation of ∆wi = log
wi,d
wi,o. The
subscripts d and o are for the starting wage of the destination job and the ending wage of the




∆wi = γ0z + ui, observed if yi = 1
where
(
yi = 1 if y∗
i > 0;
yi = 0 otherwise.
The selection equation uses the worker and ﬁrm covariates of the regression equation and
variables aﬀecting the recall of wages (the duration and recency of the job). The tables show
robust (Eicker-White) standard errors. The Sampsel procedure of Tsp is used for the estimation.
Table 2 contains analysis of subsets of the data deﬁned by occupation or education level.
Because estimates of the selection equation are ineﬃcient in such subsets, the models in this
15table instead uses the Heckman (1976) two-step estimation procedure. In this procedure, the
inverse Mills ratio φ(ˆ β0x)/Φ(ˆ β0x) is computed from the selection equation on the full data and
added to the wage equation.
3.2 Results
Table 1 shows the results of analyses of wage increases due to change in jobs across ﬁrms.
Moves across and within industries are pooled (but are separated later), and an indicator for
across-industry moves is added. The three worker cohorts are analysed together, as analysis of
each cohort separately indicated that they did not have diﬀerent labor market outcomes. Since
the measure of the proportion of larger ﬁrms in the industry aﬀects both the reservation wage
and the probability that a large ﬁrm will be entered, this measure and the destination ﬁrm sizes
are entered both singly and together. In model 3 where all are entered, the coeﬃcient estimate
of the proportion of larger ﬁrms shows its eﬀect on the wage gain, net of the gain by moving
into a large ﬁrm. In model 1 where destination ﬁrm sizes are omitted, it shows the gross eﬀect
of searching for jobs in a labor market with many large ﬁrms (the sum of the distribution eﬀect
and the expected beneﬁt of entering a large ﬁrm).
======Insert Table 1 about here.======
Consistent with hypothesis (H1), the proportion of ﬁrms larger than the origin ﬁrm shows
a positive and signiﬁcant estimate in the models 1 and 3. As one would expect, its magnitude
is smaller when the destination ﬁrm size is controlled for. Consistent with hypothesis (H2),
the origin ﬁrm size indicators have negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient estimates in all models,
showing that the beneﬁt of changing ﬁrms is greater when the origin ﬁrm is small. Note that
the positive intercepts shows an expected gain from job changes regardless of ﬁrm sizes. In
our data, 72.7% of the moves have positive wage gains and 53.0% have a wage gain of 5% or
higher, suggesting rational search behavior and a high proportion of voluntary job changes. The
estimates for destination ﬁrm size do not support hypothesis (H3) except when the proportion
of larger ﬁrms is omitted from the equation. Thus, in the model entering covariates for the
proportion of larger ﬁrms and the origin ﬁrm size, which were derived from our model, there
is no remaining destination ﬁrm size eﬀect on wage increases. The ﬁrm-size distribution eﬀect
can thus fully account for the observed wage increase when changing ﬁrms.
16Estimates of the eﬀect of origin and destination ﬁrm size on wage gains from mobility
are rarely done, but the negative coeﬃcients of origin ﬁrm size and positive coeﬃcients of
destination ﬁrm size parallell ﬁndings by Hannan, Sch¨ omann, and Blossfeld (1990), who used
the German life-history data. In sum, the ﬁndings support our theoretical predictions that
wage gains are greater when the worker is (H1) entering an industry with many ﬁrms larger
than the origin ﬁrm and (H2) leaving a small ﬁrm.
Apart from these main ﬁndings, we also see from Table 1 that the number of previous jobs
negatively aﬀects the wage gain. This may be due to personal reputations. Since workers
who have moved frequently in the past will be suspected of leaving soon, their wage gains
are smaller. An alternative interpretation from human capital theory is that frequent movers
neglect to build up their human capital (Mincer and Jovanovic, 1981).
The above analysis pooled data on workers in diﬀerent jobs and with diﬀerent educational
backgrounds. It is of some interest to investigate whether the ﬁndings on industry distribution
and ﬁrm size eﬀects are similar across subsets of workers, as some argue that worker oppor-
tunities vary substantially by worker characteristics and industrial sector. To this end, we
conducted analysis of wage gains with more homogeneous subsets of the data. Table 2 contains
analyses of the wage gains from job moves on subsets deﬁned by whether the worker changed
industry, had a blue or white collar job, and by educational level. The control variables of
these analyses are the same as in Model 1, but their coeﬃcient estimates are omitted to con-
serve space. The number of observations diﬀer substantially among these data sets, and are
given next to the coeﬃcient estimates. Because these subsets of data are smaller than the full
set, estimates of the selection equation from each dataset would be ineﬃcient. Instead we use
the Heckman (1976) two-step procedure by inserting the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the
selection equation of the full dataset as a covariate in each model.
======Insert Table 2 about here.======
The variables describing the size of the origin ﬁrm have rather similar estimates across these
data sets. The general conclusion is that leaving medium-size ﬁrms gives higher wage gains
than leaving large ﬁrms, and leaving small ﬁrms gives the greatest wage gains. In the two
smallest datasets these coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant, which could be due to the low number of
observations. In the analysis of within-industry mobility, however, the number of observations
17is signiﬁcantly high that we take the results as suggesting that origin ﬁrm size has lower (and
perhaps no) eﬀect on wage changes for workers who move within the industry. The proportion
of ﬁrms larger than the origin ﬁrm always has the predicted sign, but is not always signiﬁcant.
It is diﬃcult to interpret this in the small dataset of university-educated persons, but for within-
industry moves it is possible that the industry size distribution has less eﬀect when workers
are suﬃciently knowledgeable about ﬁrms in their industry that they do not need to form
expectations by simple rules such as ﬁrm size, unlike workers who enter the industry from the
outside. Overall the ﬁndings are clearly supportive of our theoretical predictions also in these
more homogenous subsets of the data.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
We have shown that the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect can occur in a single equilibrium with homogeneous
workers. A large ﬁrm is better oﬀ by paying a high wage thanks to the reduced turnover cost,
and a small ﬁrm cannot imiate a large ﬁrm because it cannot establish a good expectation
among workers. We also provided a new ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect by showing that the ﬁrm size
distribution aﬀects wage changes after job moves. Both our theoretical result and the evidence
are quite new, so we relate our work to the literature.
First we discuss related ideas to our theoretical result. Coles (1998) shows another “ﬁrm
reputation” model of wage diﬀerences. In his model a ﬁrm size-wage function is given and then
deviations from it is punished by workers’ intense search. As we argued in the introduction,
the multiple wage equilibrium is obtained due to the equal proﬁt assumption. Since high
wage ﬁrms have less turnover, they grow to become large ﬁrms. We think that the size is
not a consequence of high wage, but the high wage is chosen by large ﬁrms voluntarily. His
“reputation mechanism” is another trigger strategy, but the reputation is only dependent on
the ﬁrm size-wage function and not on the history of wages. We think that the historical
ﬁrm behavior aﬀects worker reactions, especially for large ﬁrms. Thus we modelled that only
large ﬁrms are susceptible to the reputation mechanism and that is the unobserved diﬀerence
generating the equilibrium wage diﬀerence. In addition, we show that the large ﬁrms earn more
total proﬁt than small ﬁrms since they can imitate small ﬁrms but not the other way around.
In a land market model, Nishimura (1999) gives a related idea of prices serving as a signal
18for future utility. Although his model is one-shot and the equilibrium concept is diﬀerent, the
essense that the prices are strategically set taking the signalling eﬀect into account is close to
ours. Spence’s famous signalling model (1974) also shows that players choose actions not only
for the current beneﬁt but for a long-term considerations. We think that the wages are also a
long-term strategy.
As we emphasized, we do not need any physical asymmetry (work conditions, productivities
etc.) among the ﬁrms of diﬀerent size or among the workers at diﬀerent size ﬁrms. This is
theoretically a stronger result than other models generating the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect under
asymmetry such as Weiss and Landau (1984). It is easy, though, to extend our model to allow
asymmetries such as worker skills and eﬀort. A large ﬁrm has an additional beneﬁt of paying
a high wage when its workers can increase productivity knowing that they will not quit so
often. Thus the ﬁrm size-wage eﬀect will be strengthened. It is also possible to extend the
model to include multiple ﬁrms. Fujiwara-Greve (1999a) shows that the trigger stratgy used
in Proposition 3 can constitute a Nash equilibrium of a market game where many ﬁrms and
workers search each other simultaneously.
Finally we emphasize that our empirical analysis of ﬁrm size distribution is unprecedented.
The measure of the proportion of larger ﬁrms than the previous employer captured the eﬀect
of ﬁrm size distribution in wage changes completely, because entering the destination ﬁrm size
did not give any additional eﬀect. As an empirical analysis, accounting fully of an eﬀect is
rare and valued. Thus our approach to look at the wage gains of job changes compensates well
the studies of ﬁrm size eﬀect on wage levels (e.g., Brown and Medoﬀ, 1989, and Bayard and
Troske, 1999). Moreover, the empirical analyses clearly show that the job changes are strategic
(by positive wage gain and ﬁrm size distribution eﬀect). Thus our result strongly supports the
game model of wage determination, with both ﬁrms and workers bahaving strategically.
19Appendix I: Proofs of the Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1.
Under the stationary expectation, a worker’s optimization problem is a stationary dis-
counted dynamic programming problem, which is shown to have a stationary optimal solution
(see Blackwell, 1965). We will show (A) the value function of the dynamic programming
problem given that a worker searches every period with a reservation level R, (B) the optimal
reservation level that maximizes the value function, (C) the condition under which not searching
in any period is optimal, and (D) the condition under which stationary search is optimal.
(A) Value function under search: Suppose that the ﬁrm has paid u and oﬀers w forever after.
The value function (the total expected discounted payoﬀ) when the worker searches every
period and accepts any oﬀer not less than R is computed as follows. (Note that the reservation
strategy is optimal because of the stationary oﬀers.) In this period, the stage payoﬀ is u− s
1−δ.
In the next period, there are two cases. If an oﬀer x ≥ R arrives, he/she takes it and start





the oﬀer was less than R (with probability F(R)), the situation becomes just like this period
but with the initial payment w. Let VS(u,w∞) be the total expected discounted payoﬀ of this
strategy given this period payment u and the future oﬀers w,w,.... The second case gives
VS(w,w∞). Thus,








f(x)dx + δF(R)VS(w,w∞), (5)
and analogously
VS(w,w










One can solve (6) and plug in (5) to obtain the explicit form of VS(u,w∞).
(B) An optimal reservation level is R that maximizes VS(u,w). Since VS(u,w) and VS(w,w)
diﬀer only in the ﬁrst constant term, we diﬀerentiate VS(w,w) to ﬁnd the optimal R. It is
easy to show that the ﬁrst order condition ∂VS
∂R = 0 is necessary and suﬃcient to determine the
optimal reservation level, and the ﬁrst order condition is equivalent to (2).
We show that the solution R(w) to (2) exists and is unique under Assumption 1. Deﬁne
20the left hand side of (2) as




By diﬀerentiation, ` is strictly increasing in R. Thus it suﬃces to show that `(w) < (1−δ)w−s <
`(w). Plugging in R = w we obtain




by Assumption 1. Moreover,
`(w) = (1 − δ)w > (1 − δ)w − s.
Hence there is a unique optimal reservation level R(w).
(C) We prove that when the ﬁrm’s stationary oﬀer satsiﬁes w ≥ ˆ wδ, then the opimal strategy
is not to search in any period by showing that a one-step deviation does not give a larger
total payoﬀ. This is suﬃcient thanks to the result that in a bounded discounted dynamic
programming problem, an unimprovable strategy in single-step is optimal. See for example
Kreps (1990), Appendix Two Proposition 4.
Take a subgame where the ﬁrm just paid u and oﬀers w,w,... forever after. The total
expected discounted payoﬀ of the non-search strategy is u + δ w
1−δ. If the worker deviates and
searches for one period with a reservation level R∗, the total discounted expected payoﬀ is












By diﬀerentiation, the optimal reservation level after a deviation is w. Substituting this and




≥ D ⇐⇒ s ≥ δ
Z w
w
(x − w)f(x)dx ⇐⇒ w ≥ ˆ wδ.
Hence as long as w ≥ ˆ wδ, it is optimal not to search.
(D) Suppose that the expected stationary wage is w < ˆ wδ. Then the constant search strategy
with the optimal reservation level R(w) gives the total expected discounted payoﬀ of VS(u,w∞)
with R = R(w). If a worker deviates and did not search for one period, the total expected
discounted payoﬀ is
D
0 = u + δVS(w,w
∞),
21with R = R(w). Hence a deviation is not beneﬁtial if
VS(u,w
∞) ≥ D
0 ⇐⇒ w[1 − δF(w)] − δ
Z w
w
xf(x)dx ≤ (1 − δ)w − s
which is equivalent to w ≤ ˆ wδ.
Lemma 1: Under Assumption 1, as δ converges to one, the optimal reservation level R(w)





R∗∗ xf(x)dx = −s.
Moreover w < R∗∗ < w.
Proof of Lemma 1. As δ → 1, the left hand side of (2) converges to `∗(R) := R(1 − F(R)) −
R w
R xf(x)dx while the right hand side of (2) converges to −s. By diﬀerentiation, `∗ is strictly
increasing in R. By Assumption 1,
`




which implies that the solution R∗∗ to `∗(R) = −s strictly exceeds w. Since `∗(w) = 0, the
solution to `∗(R) = −s is strictly smaller than w.
Proof of Proposition 2.
We show (A) for lage δ’s, in any subgame, the suggested strategy for the workers is optimal
given that the ﬁrm follows its strategy, and (B) for large δ’s, the ﬁrm’s strategy is optimal in
any subgame given the workers’.
(A) Take any subgame where the ﬁrm has just paid u and oﬀered w for the next period. (It is
possible that u = w, when it is a new employee.) Given the ﬁrm’s strategy, the future oﬀers
are w,w,.... In this generic subgame, we show that the optimal reservation level given search
is R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w), and then search is better than deviating to not to search for one
period.
First, notice that from next period on, (if this worker did not quit in this period), the worker
faces a constant oﬀer w,w,.... In Proposition 1, we have computed the optimal reservation
level R(w) for next period on. Thus, the optimal value of the constant search from next period
on is
VS(w,w











VS(w,w∞) = VS(w,w∞) − (w − w) = R(w)/(1 − δ) − (w − w).
The last equality uses the the ﬁrst order condition VS(w∞) =
R(w)
1−δ .
Going back to the current period, the value of constant search with reservation level y is
VS(u,w,w












∂y = 0 implies that the optimal reservation level y is
y = R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w).
Thus the reservation level in the suggested strategy is optimal.
Now suppose that the worker is at the search decision node. If he/she deviates for one
period and does not search but conforms to the constant search strategy from the next period
on, the total expected discounted payoﬀ is
D = u + δVS(w,w
∞).




(x − R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w))f(x)dx.






(x − R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w))f(x)dx.
Therefore there exists δ∗ ∈ (0,1) such that for any δ ≥ δ∗, VS(u,w,w∞) ≥ D, i.e., the worker
does not devieate to no-search.
(B) We show that the ﬁrm does not deviate from constant w,w,... for one period. In the
subgames where the ﬁrm has a new employee, if the ﬁrm follows the the constant oﬀer strategy
w,w,..., the total expected discounted payoﬀ Π(w∞) satisﬁes
Π(w
∞) = v − w + δ{1 − F(R(w))}[Π(w
∞) − c] + δF(R(w))Π(w
∞) (7)
On the other hand, if the ﬁrm oﬀers w > w for this period, it can reduce the quit rate by
pushing up the worker’s reservation level to R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w). However, if the worker
23quits nevertheless (with probability 1 − F(R(w)) + (1 − δ)(w − w))) , it will start oﬀering w
from next period and the continuation value is Π(w∞)−c. If the worker stayed this period, the
ﬁrm pays w next period instead of w, and then conforms to oﬀering w,w,.... Thus the total
expected discounted payoﬀ becomes
D(w,w∞) = v − w + δ{1 − F(R(w)) + (1 − δ)(w − w)}[Π(w∞) − c]
+δF(R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w))[Π(w∞) − w + w].
Therefore Π(w∞) ≥ D(w,w∞) if and only if
w − w ≥ δ{F(R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w)) − F(R(w))}[c − (w − w)].
Since limδ→1 R(w) + (1 − δ)(w − w) = limδ→1 R(w) = R∗∗ (see Lemma 1), the right hand side
of the above inequality goes to zero as δ approaches to one. Hence there exists δ∗∗ ∈ (0,1) such
that for any δ ≥ δ∗∗, Π(w∞) ≥ D(w,w∞). Thus, the ﬁrm does not deviate in any subgame
where it has a new employee.
Take any subgame where the ﬁrm oﬀered u in the previous period and the worker did not
quit. Then this period payment is u. If the ﬁrm oﬀers w for one period, and then conforms to
w,w,..., the total expected discounted payoﬀ is
Π0(u,w,w∞) = v − u + δ{1 − F(R(w)) + (1 − δ)(w − w)}[Π(w∞) − c]




= δ(1 − δ)f(R(w)) + (1 − δ)(w − w))[c − (w − w)] − δF(R(w)) + (1 − δ)(w − w)).
When δ approaches to one, the derivative becomes −F(R∗∗) < 0. Hence the optimal deviation
for large δ is w. Therefore there exists δ∗∗∗ ∈ (0,1) such that for any δ ≥ δ∗∗∗, the ﬁrm does
not deviate. Lastly let δ = Max{δ∗,δ∗∗,δ∗∗∗}.
Proof of Proposition 3.
By Proposition 2, the suggested strategy combination is a subgame perfect equilibrium if
the ﬁrm is small or if they are in a subgame where the ﬁrm has oﬀered a wage less than w∗. We
show that the strategy combination is a subagme perfect equilibrium if the ﬁrm is large and it
has never oﬀered less than w∗ ∈ [ˆ wδ,Min{v,w}].
24(A) Workers: Suppose that the ﬁrm has maintained wages not less than w∗ in the past, paid
u ≥ w∗, and oﬀered w ≥ w∗ for the next period. If the current worker follows the suggested
strategy, he/she does not search and the total expected discounted payoﬀ is u+δw+δ2w∗/(1−δ)
since the ﬁrm will oﬀer w∗ from the next period on. If the worker deviates one period and
searches with reservation level r, he/she receives












By diﬀerentiation, the optimal reservation level is r = (1−δ)w + δw∗ and note that this is not




(z − x)f(x)dx ≥ 0.
Since r ≥ ˆ wδ and
R w




(r − x)f(x)dx ≥ s + δ
Z w
ˆ wδ
( ˆ wδ − x)f(x)dx > 0.
Therefore the worker does not deviate.
(B) Firm: Take a subgame where it has paid u. Note that oﬀering w∗ is enough to prevent
search, the ﬁrm has no incentive to oﬀer more than w∗. If it oﬀers less than w∗, the optimal
oﬀer is the minimum wage w thanks to Proposition 2, for suﬃciently large δ. Then its total
expected discounted payoﬀ is
Π(u,w∞) = v − u + δ{1 − F(R(w))}[Π(w∞) − c] + δF(R(w))Π(w∞)
where Π(w∞) is determined by (7) in the proof of Proposition 2 so that
Π(w
∞) = [v − w − δ{1 − F(R(w))}c]/(1 − δ).
If the ﬁrm follows the suggested strategy w∗,w∗,..., the total payoﬀ is v−u+δ v−w∗
1−δ . Thus,
the suggested strategy is unimprovable if and only if
v − u + δ
v − w∗
1 − δ




Therefore for suﬃciently large δ, no player deviates for one period in any subgame, thus the




Starting wages Monthly income from employer at start of job spell,
deflated to 1968 kroner
NLHS
Ending wages Monthly income from employer at end of job spell,
deflated to 1968 kroner
NLHS
Junior high school 1 if completed junior high school, but not senior high
school
NLHS
Senior high school 1 if completed senior high school, but not started
university studies
NLHS
1+ years of university 1 if completed one or more years of college or
university
NLHS
Labor force experience Time since entry into labor force in months NLHS
Previous jobs Logged number of jobs previously held by worker NLHS
Moved across
industries
1 if origin and destination industry (2-digit code) is
different
NLHS
Industry size diversity One minus Herfindahl concentration index of
establishment size in 2-digit industry
Census
Industry size Number of employees in the industry, measured in
millions.
Census
Mean wage Industry wage payment per worker, deflated to 1968
kroner
Census
Government 1 if the destination employer was a government-
owned organization
NLHS
Private 5-49 1 if the employer (origin or destination) was a private
firm with 5-49 workers
NLHS
Private 50+ 1 if the employer (origin or destination) was a private
with 50 or more workers
NLHS
Proportion larger firms Proportion of establishments in destination industry
larger than origin employer
NLHS /
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Figure 1: Timing of the game
28TABLE 1
ESTIMATES OF WAGE CHANGE FROM INTERFIRM JOB
CHANGE, MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD SAMPLE SELECTIVITY
Model
           (1)          (2)           (3)
Intercept 1.004 1.065 0.987
(0.139) (0.147) (0.141)
Worker control variables:
Junior high education -0.031 -0.016 -0.018
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Senior high eduction -0.076** -0.096** -0.094**
(0.028) (0.030) (0.030)
1+ years of university -0.051 -0.058 -0.055
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Labor force experience 0.00018 0.00017 0.00017
(0.00012) (0.00012) (0.00021)
Previous jobs -0.083** -0.089** -0.089**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Industry control variables:
Moved across industry -0.026 -0.027 -0.027
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Size diversity -0.678** -0.511** -0.660**
(0.147) (0.140) (0.151)
Total employment 0.002 0.005 0.002
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011)
Mean wage 0.010 0.020 0.011
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014)
Destination industry (H1):
Proportion larger firms 0.207** 0.172*
(0.070) (0.075)
Origin firm (H2):
Private, 5-49 workers -0.083* -0.079* -0.083**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Private-sector, 50+ workers -0.170** -0.172** -0.175**
(0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Destination firm (H3):
Government owned 0.066 0.058
(0.055) (0.055)
Private, 5-49 workers 0.041 0.032
(0.028) (0.029)
Private, 50+ workers 0.067* 0.048
(0.029) (0.031)Note:  Eicker-White (robust) standard errors are in parantheses.
Significance levels from two-sided tests denoted by symbols *(p < .05)
and **(p < .01).
TABLE 2











Across industry 1981 -0.111** -0.224** 0.224*
Within industry 935 -0.033 -0.074 0.023
Until junor high school 1926 -0.052 -0.166** 0.184*
Senior high school  667 -0.190** -0.271** 0.430**
University 323 -0.082 -0.085 0.002
Blue-collar workers 2427 -0.096* -0.200** 0.163
White-collar workers 489 -0.077 -0.120† 0.341*
Note:  Eicker-White (robust) standard errors are used for hypothesis tests. Significance
levels from two-sided tests denoted by symbols †(p < .10), *(p < .05), and **(p < .01).